The Bounded Laplace Mechanism in Differential Privacy by Holohan, Naoise et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
10
41
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
0 A
ug
 20
18
The Bounded Laplace Mechanism in Differential Privacy
Naoise Holohan
IBM Research – Ireland
naoise@ibm.com
Spiros Antonatos
IBM Research – Ireland
santonat@ie.ibm.com
Stefano Braghin
IBM Research – Ireland
stefanob@ie.ibm.com
Po´l Mac Aonghusa
IBM Research – Ireland
aonghusa@ie.ibm.com
ABSTRACT
eLaplacemechanism is theworkhorse of differential privacy, ap-
plied to many instances where numerical data is processed. How-
ever, the Laplace mechanism can return semantically impossible
values, such as negative counts, due to its infinite support. ere
are two popular solutions to this: (i) bounding/capping the out-
put values and (ii) bounding the mechanism support. In this pa-
per, we show that bounding the mechanism support, while using
the parameters of the pure Laplace mechanism, does not typically
preserve differential privacy. We also present a robust method to
compute the optimal mechanism parameters to achieve differential
privacy in such a seing.
KEYWORDS
Differential privacy, Laplacemechanism, consistency, bounds, boun-
ded mechanism, truncated mechanism, resampling, rejection sam-
pling
1 INTRODUCTION
Data privacy is an important factor that data ownersmust take into
consideration when collecting, storing and publishing user data.
is extends to publishing statistics on user data. In recent years,
differential privacy has emerged as a popular privacy framework,
thanks to its robust mathematical privacy guarantees.
e Laplace mechanism is the workhorse of differential privacy,
frequently utilised in applications on numerical data. Its strength
lies in its mathematical and computational simplicity, in contrast
to other mechanisms such as the exponential mechanism. In spite
of its popularity however, the Laplace mechanism lacks consistency
in its output. Consider, for example, adding noise from the Laplace
mechanism to a count query; negative results hold no meaning,
yet are a valid output of the mechanism, occurring especially fre-
quently for low-numbered counts.
Example 1.1. Suppose we are querying a census dataset, and
seeking to learn the number of people born onMars. Adding noise
from a Laplace mechanism with variance 2
ϵ 2
will satisfy differen-
tial privacy. Although the real answer to the query is 0 (for now at
least!), we must add noise to protect the privacy of future human
Martians. Successive outputs from the Laplace mechanism could
be: −1.71, 2.31, −1.20, 0.652.
However bizarre the query, negative outputs are patently illogi-
cal and inconsistent. By the symmetry of the Laplace distribution,
on average 50% of the outputs will be negative.
Currently there are two solutions to this drawback, both involv-
ing the selection of an appropriate output domain. If selection of
the domain is done independently of the data, no privacy budget
is consumed. e first, truncation, is to project values outside the
domain to the closest value within the domain. e second, bound-
ing, is to continue to sample independently from the mechanism
until a value within the domain is returned.
Example 1.2. Using the same set-up as Example 1.1, if the Laplace
mechanism returns a value −1.71, the truncation method projects
the output to 0 (the lower bound of a count query). If the bound-
ing method is used, the value is simply re-sampled, meaning the
second value 2.31 is returned (an analyst may subsequently wish
to round this to 2).
By design, the truncated Laplace mechanism has a (possibly
large) non-zero probability of returning values at the domain bounds.
ere are instances where this may be undesirable and/or incom-
patible, such as when the domain bounds coincide with singular-
ities or values that otherwise result in a qualitative change in be-
haviour (e.g. bifurcation points). In such cases truncation may not
be best-suited.
Example 1.3. Consider the case of releasing the variance of a
distribution while using the Laplace mechanism to achieve differ-
ential privacy. Zero variance is qualitatively different to non-zero
variance, and may result in complications in its use. In this case
the bounded mechanism is a more appropriate choice as it has a
zero probability of returning a zero variance.
In this paperwe show that the boundedLaplacemechanism does
not typically satisfy differential privacy when inheriting parame-
ters from the pure Laplace mechanism (see Section 3). In fact, in
almost all cases, the variance of the Laplace distribution must be
increased for the bounded Laplace mechanism to satisfy the same
differential privacy constraints.
e statistical properties of the truncated and bounded Laplace
mechanisms were initially studied in [1]; further comparisons of
the two mechanisms are beyond the scope of this paper.
Complete proofs to most lemmas and theorems are given in the
Appendix.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We first detail the notation that we’ll use in this paper, broadly
following the style introduced in [2].
We are interested in queries Q : Sn → D on databases d ∈ Sn
mapping to a finite domain D = [l ,u] (l < u , both finite). e sen-
sitivity ofQ is defined in the usual way, ∆Q = maxh(d,d′)=1 |Q(d)−
Q(d′)|, where h : Sn × Sn → N denotes Hamming distance.
In this paper we are only concerned with output perturbation
mechanisms, so we need only consider response mechanisms of
the form Yq : Ω → R for each q ∈ D (since Q(S
n ) ⊆ D). Given
ϵ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, the mechanism {Yq | q ∈ D} satisfies
(ϵ ,δ )-differential privacy when
P(Yq ∈ A) ≤ e
ϵ
P(Yq′ ∈ A) + δ ,
for all measurable A ⊆ R and whenever |q − q′ | ≤ ∆Q .
We denote by Lap(µ,b) a Laplace distribution with mean µ and
variance 2b2. e standard Laplace mechanism is therefore given
by
Yq = q + Lap(0,b) = Lap(q,b), (1)
and satisfies (ϵ ,δ )-differential privacy when b ≥
∆Q
ϵ−log(1−δ )
[2, Ex-
ample 5]. Note thatP(Yq ∈ R\D) > 0, whereas we seek Range(Yq) =
D for consistency.
3 BOUNDED LAPLACE MECHANISM
As the support of the Laplace distribution is infinite, it is common
for the output of the Laplace mechanism to fall outside the range
of Q . Currently, there are two popular solutions to overcome this.
e first, which we will call truncation, involves a deterministic
mapping to the upper/lower bounds of the output domain, when
the value falls outside.
Another approach is to bound the support of the response mech-
anism, and then sample directly from the output domain (e.g. by
inverse transform sampling). is can also be achieved through
rejection sampling, by continually redrawing from the unbounded
distribution until an output falls within the domain. We will refer
to this process as bounding, as the pure outputs of the mechanism
are bounded by design.
Definition 3.1 (Bounded Laplace Mechanism). Given b > 0 and
D ⊂ R, the bounded Laplace mechanismWq : Ω → D, for each
q ∈ D, is given by its probability density function fWq :
fWq (x) =


0, if x < D,
1
Cq
1
2b
e−
|x−q |
b , if x ∈ D,
where Cq =
∫
D
1
2b
e−
|x−q |
b dx is a normalisation constant.
Remark 1: It follows that P(Wq ∈ D) = 1, and, conversely, that
P(Wq ∈ R \ D) = 0.
Remark 2: GivenA ⊆ R, P(Wq ∈ A) =
1
Cq
P(Yq ∈ A∩D), where
Yq is given in (1).
As the output distribution is now a function of the query an-
swer Q(d) = q, the normalisation factor Cq is no longer constant.
It is therefore no longer guaranteed that the mechanismWq satis-
fies differential privacy using parameters from the (pure) Laplace
mechanism.
3.1 Preliminary Results
We first establish an algebraic representation for Cq .
Lemma 3.2. For Cq as given in Definition 3.1, and for q ∈ D =
[l ,u],
Cq = 1 −
1
2
(
e−
q−l
b + e−
u−q
b
)
.
We next consider the following lemma concerning Cq .
Lemma 3.3. Let Cq be given by Definition 3.1. en,
max
q,q′∈D
|q′−q |≤∆Q
Cq′
Cq
e
|q′−q |
b =
Cl+∆Q
Cl
e
∆Q
b .
Proof. e following is an outline of the full proof given in
Section A.1. By the symmetry ofCq about
u+l
2 , we can assume that
q′ ≥ q. Showing that ∂
∂z
(
Cq+z
Cq
e
z
b
)
≥ 0 and ∂
∂q
(
Cq+z
Cq
e
z
b
)
≤ 0
completes the proof. 
is leads us to the following definition of ∆C(b) for later use.
Definition 3.4. Given Cq from Definition 3.1, and noting that
Cq = Cq(b) is a function of b , we define ∆C(b) as follows:
∆C(b) =
Cl+∆Q(b)
Cl (b)
.
3.2 Main Result
We now proceed to the main result of this paper, which defines the
variance required for the bounded Laplace mechanism.
Theorem 3.5. LetWq be the bounded Laplace mechanism given
in Definition 3.1 and let ϵ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 be given. en
{Wq | q ∈ D} satisfies (ϵ ,δ )-differential privacy whenever
b ≥
∆Q
ϵ − log∆C(b) − log(1 − δ )
. (2)
Proof. e following is an outline of the full proof given in
Section A.2. We are seeking to show that
P(Wq ∈ A) ≤ e
ϵ
P(Wq′ ∈ A) + δ ,
for any measurable A ⊆ D and where q,q′ ∈ D, |q − q′ | ≤ ∆Q .
For this to hold it is sufficient to show that 1 ≤ eϵ−
|q′−q |
b
Cd
Cq′
+ δ .
Furthermore by Lemma 3.3, it is sufficient to show that
1 ≤
1
∆C(b)
eϵ−
∆Q
b + δ ,
which can be solved implicitly for b to complete the proof. 
Discussion: To satisfy (ϵ ,δ )-differential privacy using the bounded
Laplace mechanism, its variance will never be less than that of the
(pure) Laplace mechanism (since ∆C(b) ≥ 1). In the case of achiev-
ing ϵ-differential privacy (i.e. δ = 0), the underlying Laplace distri-
bution must be one which satisfies ϵ ′-differential privacy, where
ϵ ′ = ϵ − log∆C(b) (i.e. for a target ϵ , we require an effective ϵ ′).
Inverse transform sampling or rejection sampling can then be used
to determine the output. As shown in Figure 1, the impact on ϵ ′ is
most pronounced when ∆Q and ϵ are small; the graphical evidence
aligns with the intuition that 2ϵ ′ = ϵ in the limiting case.
However, finding the optimal value for b is non-trivial since the
relationship given in eorem 3.5 is implicitly defined. is prob-
lem is examined in Section 4.
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Figure 1: Relationship of ϵϵ ′ to ∆Q and ϵ , where u − l = 1 and δ = 0 are fixed.
e simpler task of determining a value of ϵ (or a relationship
between ϵ and δ ) to a given value of b can be achieved with (2).
4 CALCULATING b
From the conclusion ofeorem 3.5, let’s define the following fixed
point operator for b .
Definition 4.1 (Fixed Point Operator). Given ∆Q > 0, ϵ ≥ 0 and
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, we define the fixed point operator f : R>0 → R>0 by
f (b) =
∆Q
ϵ − log∆C(b) − log(1 − δ )
. (3)
Any positive fixed point of f (i.e. b∗ = f (b∗) > 0) will act as
a differentially private shape parameter for the bounded Laplace
mechanism. In advance of examining f , we first define
b0 =
∆Q
ϵ − log(1 − δ )
.
Note thatb0 determines the variance required for the (pure) Laplace
mechanism to achieve (ϵ ,δ )-differential privacy.
We now present a number of lemmas concerning f , namely
(i) the value of f (b0) and (ii) the monotonicity of f . Proofs are
given in Sections A.3 and A.4.
Lemma 4.2. f (b0) ≥ b0, and f (b0) = b0 if and only if ∆Q = u − l .
Lemma 4.3. f ′(b) ≤ 0 whenever b , 0, and f ′(b) = 0 if and only
if ∆Q = u − l .
is leads us to the main result of this section, that f has a
unique fixed point b∗.
Theorem4.4 (Fixed Point). ere exists a uniqueb∗ ∈ [b0, f (b0)]
such that b∗ = f (b∗), and b∗ = b0 = f (b0) if and only if ∆Q = u − l .
Proof. Since f (b0) ≥ b0 (Lemma 4.2), f
′ ≤ 0 (Lemma 4.3) and
f (b) is continuous on b ∈ [b0,∞) (since it is differentiable), it fol-
lows that f (b) has a unique fixed point b∗ ∈ [b0,∞), where unique-
ness follows from the monotonicity of f .
Furthermore, since f ′ ≤ 0 and f (b0) ≥ b0, it follows that
f (f (b0)) ≤ f (b0). We must therefore have b
∗ ∈ [b0, f (b0)]. And,
since f (b0) = b0 if and only if ∆Q = u − l (Lemma 4.2), the result
follows. 
It follows from eorem 4.4 that the mechanismWq from Def-
inition 3.1 satisfies differential privacy for b = b∗. Given that we
have a bounded domain in which b∗ lies, and since f is continuous,
the bisection method is guaranteed to converge to b∗ for any given
ϵ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, u > l and ∆Q ≤ u − l .
Theorem 4.5. Let b∗ ∈ R>0 such that b
∗
= f (b∗). en, given
any ξ > 0,
b∗ + ξ > f (b∗ + ξ ).
Proof. By eorem 4.4, such a fixed point b∗ exists. Further-
more, from Lemma 4.3 we have f ′(b) < 0, hence
f (b∗ + ξ ) < f (b∗) = b∗ < b∗ + ξ . 
Consequently by eorem 3.5, any fixed point b∗ is a lower
bound on all values b that satisfy (ϵ ,δ )-differential privacy.
5 RELATED WORK
In [1], the statistical properties of bounding and truncating the
Laplace mechanism were explored, without examining the differ-
ential privacy properties of the bounded Laplace mechanism. e
same author followedwith a study on generalised Gaussian mecha-
nisms for differential privacy [3]. e results applied to the bounded
Laplace mechanism showed a doubling of the noise variance (ϵ =
2ϵ ′) is required, an increase we now know to be excessive.
In [4], regression analysis under differential privacywas studied.
e authors looked to add noise (using the Laplace mechanism) to
the coefficients of an objective function to achieve differential pri-
vacy, but this can result in an unbounded objective function. eir
first approach at solving this was to re-run the differential privacy
mechanism until the result gives a solution to the optimisation
problem. is approach has the effect of doubling the noise vari-
ance (since ϵ = 2ϵ ′), which our work has shown may be excessive.
e authors also proposed an alternative approach to maintain the
privacy budget at ϵ .
A naı¨ve Bayes machine learning classifier was described in [5],
which achieves differential privacy by adding Laplace noise to the
model parameters. For numerical data, naı¨ve Bayes calculates the
3
mean and standard deviation of the feature in order to classify un-
seen data. e authors propose re-sampling from the Laplace dis-
tribution to ensure the differentially private standard deviations
are positive, without modifying the variance. From what we now
know, this approach does not satisfy differential privacy.
Consistency in differential privacy has also been studied previ-
ously. Examples include achieving consistent releases of margin-
als [6] and histograms [7]. In [6] the authors sought to release
marginals consisting of non-negative integers, with consistent sums
across marginals. is was achieved using Fourier transformations
and linear programming. In [7], the authors used constrained in-
ference to ensure consistency in histogram counts through post-
processing.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown that the bounded Laplace mechanism
does not typically satisfy differential privacy when inheriting pa-
rameters from the Laplace mechanism, except in the case when
∆Q = u − l . We have also presented details of calculating the re-
quired parameters for the bounded Laplace mechanism to satisfy
differential privacy. It was shown that the noise added to achieve
differential privacy must be of greater variance than that of the
pure Laplace mechanism.
e results of this paper highlight the dangers of re-sampling
from the Laplace mechanism in applications of differential privacy
to achieve valid/plausible outputs. Researchers may be inadver-
tently violating differential privacy in doing so, or overcompen-
sating by increasing the privacy budget excessively. Our robust
method of calculating the optimal noise variance will allow pri-
vacy researchers and practitioners to deploy the bounded Laplace
mechanism with confidence and certainty.
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APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.3
In order to prove Lemma 3.3, we must first consider the following
lemmas concerning Cq .
Lemma A.1. Let q ∈ D and b > 0, and let Cq be given by Defini-
tion 3.1. en ∂
∂z
(
Cq+z
Cq
e
z
b
)
≥ 0, whenever q + z ≤ u .
Proof. We first note that
∂
∂z
Cq+z =
1
2b
(
e−
q+z−l
b − e−
u−q−z
b
)
.
We then see that
∂
∂z
(
Cq+z
Cq
e
z
b
)
=
1
Cq
1
b
(
1 − e−
u−q−z
b
)
e
z
b .
Since b > 0 by assumption, it follows that ∂
∂z
(
Cq+z
Cq
e
z
b
)
≥ 0 if
and only if q + z ≤ u . 
Lemma A.2. Let q ∈ D and z ≥ 0, and let Cq be given by Defini-
tion 3.1. en ∂
∂q
(
Cq+z
Cq
e
z
b
)
≤ 0.
Proof. We first note that
∂
∂q
Cq+z =
1
2b
(
e−
q+z−l
b − e−
u−q−z
b
)
.
We then find
∂
∂q
(
Cq+z
Cq
e
z
b
)
=
e
z
b
Cq
2
(
Cq
∂
∂q
Cq+z −Cq+z
∂
∂q
Cq
)
=
e
z
b
2b Cq
2
(
e−
q−l
b
(
e−
z
b − 1
)
+ e−
u−q
b
(
1 − e
z
b
)
+ e−
u−l−z
b − e−
u−l+z
b
)
=
e
z
b
((
e−
z
b − 1
) (
e
u−q
b − 1
)
+
(
1 − e
z
b
) (
e
q−l
b − 1
))
2b e
u−l
b Cq
2
.
Since b > 0, it’s clear that the denominator is positive. Fur-
thermore, since q ∈ D, it follows that e
u−q
b , e
q−l
b > 1. Also, since
z ≥ 0 by assumption, we have e−
z
b < 1 and e
z
b > 1. Hence,
∂
∂q
(
Cq+z
Cq
e
z
b
)
≤ 0, as required. 
Using Lemmas A.1 and A.2, we can now prove Lemma 3.3.
Proof (Lemma 3.3). SinceCq is symmetric about
u+l
2 , we have
Cq = Cu+l−q . By leing q0 = u + l − q and q
′
0 = u + l − q
′, then,
Cq′
Cq
e
|q′−q |
b =
Cq′
0
Cq0
e
|q′
0
−q0 |
b , and q′ > q if q′0 < q0. Hence, without
loss of generality we can assume that q′ ≥ q, so we are examining
max
q,q′∈D
0≤q′−q≤∆Q
Cq′
Cq
e
q′−q
b .
Equivalently, sinceq′ ≥ q, we can considermax q∈D
0≤z≤∆Q
Cq+z
Cq
e
z
b .
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By Lemma A.2, ∂
∂q
(
Cq+z
Cq
e
z
b
)
≤ 0, hence the maximum is at-
tained at the smallest possible q, i.e.
max
q∈D
0≤z≤∆Q
Cq+z
Cq
e
z
b = max
0≤z≤∆Q
Cl+z
Cl
e
z
b .
Similarly, by Lemma A.1, ∂
∂z
(
Cq+z
Cq
e
z
b
)
≥ 0, hence the maxi-
mum is aained at the largest possiblez, givingmax q∈D
0≤z≤∆Q
Cq+z
Cq
e
z
b =
Cl+∆Q
Cl
e
∆Q
b , as required. 
A.2 Proof of eorem 3.5
Proof (Theorem 3.5). We follow a similar method of proof as
used in Example 5 of [2].
GivenA ⊆ D, and noting that P(Wq ∈ A) =
1
Cq
P(Yq ∈ A), where
Yq is given by (1), we are seeking to show that
1
Cq
P(Yq ∈ A) ≤ e
ϵ 1
Cq′
P(Yq′ ∈ A) + δ ,
for any measurable A ⊆ D and where q,q′ ∈ D and |q − q′ | ≤ ∆Q .
Given that P(Yq ∈ A) =
∫
A
e
−
|x−q |
b
2b
dx , we have,
1
Cq
∫
A
e−
|x−q |
b
2b
dx ≤ eϵ
1
Cq′
∫
A
e−
|x−q′|
b
2b
dx + δ .
Using the triangle inequality, we see that |x−q′ | ≤ |x−q |+ |q′−
q |, so it is sufficient to show that
1
Cq
∫
A
e
−
|x−q |
b
2b
dx ≤ eϵ−
|q′−q |
b 1
Cq′
∫
A
e
−
|x−q |
b
2b
dx + δ , or equivalently,
1 ≤ eϵ−
|q−q′|
b
Cq
Cq′
+
Cq∫
A
e
−
|x−q |
b
2b
dx
δ .
Since A ⊆ D and given the definition of Cq in Definition 3.1, it
follows that Cq ≥
∫
A
e
−
|x−q |
b
2b
dx , hence it is sufficient to show that
1 ≤ eϵ−
|q′−q |
b
Cd
Cq′
+ δ .
By Lemma 3.3, ∆C(b)e
∆Q
b ≥
Cq′
Cq
e
|q′−q |
b when |q′ − q | ≤ ∆Q , or
equivalently 1
∆C (b )
e−
∆Q
b ≤
Cq
Cq′
e−
|q′−q |
b , so it is sufficient to show
that
1 ≤
1
∆C(b)
eϵ−
∆Q
b + δ . (4)
Solving (4) implicitly for b completes the proof. 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof (Lemma 4.2). We first note that f (b) > 0 if and only if
ϵ − log∆C(b) − log(1 − δ ) > 0, or equivalently, if ∆C(b) < e
ϵ
1−δ
.
We assume that e
ϵ
1−δ
> 1 (i.e. that ϵ and δ are not simultaneously
zero).
Given b0 =
∆Q
ϵ−log(1−δ )
, we see that
∆C(b0) =
2 − e−ϵ+log(1−δ ) − e
−
(
u−l
∆Q −1
)
(ϵ−log(1−δ ))
1 − e
− u−l
∆Q (ϵ−log(1−δ ))
=
2 − 1−δeϵ −
(
eϵ
1−δ
)1− u−l
∆Q
1 −
(
eϵ
1−δ
)− u−l
∆Q
=
2
(
eϵ
1−δ
)
− 1 −
(
eϵ
1−δ
)2− u−l
∆Q
eϵ
1−δ
−
(
eϵ
1−δ
)1− u−l
∆Q
. (5)
For simplicity, we relabel (5) by seing α = e
ϵ
1−δ
and β = u−l
∆Q ,
giving
∆C(b0) =
2α − 1 − α2−β
α − α1−β
.
We note that α > 1 and β ≥ 1.
Since max
(
2α − α2
)
= 1 and the maximum occurs at α = 1,
it follows that 2α − α2 < 1 when α > 1. We can then make the
following series of deductions:
2α − α2 < 1,
2α − 1 < α2,
2α − 1 − α2−β < α2 − α2−β ,
2α − 1 − α2−β
α − α1−β
< α .
Hence,
∆C(b0) < α =
eϵ
1 − δ
,
and it follows that f (b0) > 0.
We can also show that ∆C(b0) ≥ 1 through the following series
of deductions:
α1−β ≤ 1, (6)
α1−β (α − 1) ≤ α − 1,
0 ≤ α − α1−β ≤ 2α − 1 − α2−β ,
2α − 1 − α2−β
α − α1−β
≥ 1.
Hence, log∆C(b0) ≥ 0. It then follows that
∆Q
ϵ − log∆C(b0) − log(1 − δ )
≥
∆Q
ϵ − log(1 − δ )
,
and that f (b0) ≥ b0. Furthermore, from (6), f (b0) = b0 if and only
if ∆Q = u − l . 
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Proof (Lemma 4.3). From (3), we have
f ′(b) =
f (b)2
∆Q∆C(b)
∂∆C(b)
∂b
,
5
hence f ′ ≤ 0 if and only if
∂∆C (b )
∂b
≤ 0. From the definition of
∆C(b), aer some simplification we have
∂∆C(b)
∂b
= −
(
1
2b Cl (b)
)2 (
∆Q
(
e−
∆Q
b + e−
2(u−l )−∆Q
b
)
+ e−
u−l
b (u − l − ∆Q)
(
e
∆Q
b + e−
∆Q
b
)
− 2(u − l)e−
u−l
b
)
≤ −
(
1
2b Cl (b)
)2 (
∆Q
(
e−
∆Q
b + e−
2(u−l )−∆Q
b
)
− 2∆Qe−
u−l
b
)
(7)
= −
(
1
2b Cl (b)
)2
∆Qe−
∆Q
b
(
1 − e−
u−l−∆Q
b
)2
≤ 0,
where (7) follows since ea + e−a ≥ 2 for all a ∈ R. Note that we
have
∂∆C (b )
∂b
= 0 if and only if ∆Q = u − l . Also note that this
result holds for all b , 0, and therefore for all b ≥ b0.
We therefore conclude that f ′(b) ≤ 0 for all b ≥ b0, and further-
more that f ′(b) = 0 if and only if ∆Q = u − l . 
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